A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC-voltage sources at both Alice's and Bob's ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single-end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc-voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice's and Bob's terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in-situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently.
Introduction
The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution scheme , see Figure  1 , is based on the properties of thermal noise of the resistors. Once it was introduced in [2] , it had the promise to provide robust, fast and unconditionally secure communications at low cost, and all the advantages of chip integrability. The information channel is composed of a wire. In the core of the simplest scheme, each communicator contains a switch that, at the beginning of each bit exchange cycle, randomly alternates between two resistors R L & R H , where we suppose R H > R L , see Figure 1 . Since, in the system, there are four different combinations of R A & R B , that is, R L R L (LL) , R H R H (HH) , R L R H (LH) and R H R L (HL), the KLJN scheme randomly alternates between four different situations. The first and second letters in the parentheses refer to the connected resistors at Alice's and Bob's ends, respectively. Note the practical scheme consists of many more elements such as noise generators, line filters, and measurement and compensation systems to secure the privacy for arbitrary situations. The power spectral density of the voltage in the wire can be written as:
While the power spectral density of the current in the wire can be written as: (1) and (2), while the LH and HL situations will be considered for the Key Exchange, since in these situations Eve cannot infer which resistance is operating in either side. A general proof about the unconditional security of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) was introduced in [2]. Several attacks against the KLJN scheme were proposed against the KLJN scheme. None of them could impair the unconditional security of the scheme, since either there was a proper defense scheme against or attack was based on misconceptions [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [27] [28] [29] [30] , including experimental errors. On the other hand, passive attacks against practical KLJN systems deviating from the ideal assumptions of the scheme [2] were discussed in several papers [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . For example, parasitic or non-ideal features such as transients, wire's resistance, cable capacitance, temperature differences, delay effects and transients, etc. are such practical issues. In each case, these discussions ultimately confirmed the security of the practical KLJN with proper parameter choices, defense circuitries, compensation techniques, or privacy amplifications [1] ..
Recently, a new attack scheme assuming the existence of single parasitic DC source at either communicating party was introduced [14] . DC current based ground loops or similar nonidealities can yield such situation. In [14] to demonstrate the security vulnerability, the following assumptions were made: 3 i) The parasitic DC source was located at only one of the end of the wire channel;
ii) Eve knew the location of this parasitic DC source.
iii) Eve knew the value of the voltage of this DC source.
The above assumptions [14] were in line with Kerckhoffs's principle of security [1] , that is, all the essential details of the secure communication system will eventually be known by the adversary except the momentary key [1] .
In the present paper, we make Eve's job much more complicated by adding an arbitrary second generator assuming that there was not yet enough time for Eve to utilize Kerckhoffs's principle of security [1] , see below.
The generalized DC ground loop situation
In [14] , we assumed a ground loop situation with a single, known DC voltage generator located at Alice's end and demonstrated the resulting information leak. In the present paper, the generalized and most common practical situation is studied with two unknown DC voltage generators of arbitrary polarity that are located at Alice's and Bob's sides, see Figure 2 . As a preparation, we introduce the mathematical notations that are similar but more complex than in [14] . Both the voltage U (t) and current I(t) in the wire have a DC and an AC (stochastic, that is, noise) components, see Figure 2 . The direction of the current I(t) is assumed to point from Alice to Bob. Then the current in the wire can be expressed as:
where the DC and AC components are:
and 
The voltage on the wire can be written as:
From (3) and (6) we obtain:
Where U DCw and U ACw (t) are the DC and AC voltage components on the wire, see Figure 2 :
From Equation 8 , it is obvious that a non-zero information leak occurs since the DC components are different in the LH and the HL bit case. Specifically, at the LH situation, that is, when
, the DC component of the wire's voltage is:
while in the HL bit situation it is:
For later usage, we evaluate the average of the above-defined U LH and U HL , and call this quantity threshold volt age, : (11) Moreover, we compare Equations (9) and (10), to obtain the following inequality:
The noise component Figure 2 , can be written as:
From (5) and (13):
Obviously, U ACw (t) has normal distribution, since it is the linear combination of Gaussian noises and DC values, and their power spectral density is the same in both the LH and HL cases [14] . Figures 3 and 4 
This behavior of the wire voltage is exploited in our new attack scheme to distinguish the LH and HL bit arrangements, as it will be discussed in Sections 3 and 4. 
Eve estimates the values of the ground-loop voltages
The first step in our attack scheme is to compare the values of U DCA and U DCB . Our assumption is that Eve originally does not know the values of the parasitic voltage sources, so first we introduce a technique to measure U DCA and U DCB , respectively. From Equation (6), we can express U DCB as:
The above equation is useful to Eve in the LL and HH situations, where she knows the connected resistors, including R B , see [14] .
U (t) and I(t) are measurable, and even though she does not know the instantaneous signal of U Bn (t) , she can use time averaging to produce:
Where t represents the time average over a time period t . If t is long enough, the AC components will converge to zero. From (16) we get:
For finite t time averages, the estimation of U DCB has error because the convergence to zero is incomplete. We will call this error . Following the same procedure for U DCA : U DCB values to determine whether the DC voltage component in the wire is higher during the LH or the HL bit situation [see (12) ]. Then Eve designs the guessing protocol discussed below. p º n cor / n tot [14] . The p = 0.5 situation indicates the perfect security limit [27] .
Can Eve use the DC current, instead of the DC voltage, in her attack scheme?
To comply with the mathematical notations used in Section 2, In the subsequent section, the attack method is demonstrated by computer simulations.
Demonstration
Eve's correct bit guessing probability p was evaluated analytically and tested by computer simulations, see Figure 6 .
For the analytic evaluation we used the error function:
where
is the probability of   Ut to exceed th U , and the error function is given as:
And eff U is the effective (rms) value of the noise voltage ACw () Ut on the wire.
In accordance to the analysis described in The results verify the effectiveness of the attack protocol shown in this paper.
Defense methods
The attack can be countered using the same defense techniques, as described in [14] , namely, cancelling the DC voltages, or by increasing the effective (rms) value of noises by increasing the noise temperature and/or the bandwidth (without exceeding the wave limit [1, 2, 29] ). All methods are the same as those discussed in [14] , except for the DC voltages cancellation techniques in which the defense can be conducted in two other ways: i) Adding variable DC-voltage sources at each side and tuning them to compensate out the parasitic sources. Alternatively tuning them to reach U DCB -U DCA = 0.
ii) Naturally, a simplified version would work as well: Adding a single variable DC voltage at one side and tuning it to reach U DCB -U DCA = 0 yielding zero DC loop current.
iii) Attaching a capacitor in series to the cable from Alice's end, Bob's end, or from both ends to eliminate DC current in the wire. Note, this maneuver requires great precautions because of its impact on line impedance and the potential information leak.
Conclusion
This paper generalizes the DC loop current attack introduced in [14] . The generalized scheme makes Eve's work easier. We provided a mathematical analysis and verified the attacks analytically and by computer simulations. We also propose effective defense techniques.
In conclusion, in practical KLJN key exchangers Alice and Bob must carry a DC loop current tests before and during operation and act accordingly (see Section 6) .
It is important to note that the general, more expensive defense method of KLJN that is based on in-situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, see Section 4.1 in [16] , works efficiently because that alarms for any deviation from the idealized situation, including parasitic DC voltages and currents.
